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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the export performance of China in electronics compared
to the east Asian NIEs exporting to the USA, the European Union, and Japan
between 1988 and 2001 using a dynamic version of shift-share analysis to
overcome some of the inherent drawbacks of the widely-used static shift-share
methodology. Our findings suggest that China has now emerged as a serious
contender in the export market for electronic goods, but this position has not
been a dominant one. For electronics as a whole, the principal gainers after
1995 appear to be newcomers China and Malaysia at the expense of the older
Tigers, like Singapore and Hong Kong. To some extent this represents a natural
process of ‘catch-up’. Moreover, no single NIE has dominated all categories of
electronic exports. In the east Asian region, the less developed members of
ASEAN would appear to be most at risk in the immediate future since they
compete head on with China in lower-end manufacturing and are in danger
of being ‘leapfrogged’ in the value-added chain. The more advanced NIEs are
in a better position since they have time to increase value-added before China
catches up and may benefit more from the opportunities China offers in terms
of production and service complementarities.
Keywords: Asian NIEs; China; electronics exports; shift-share.
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini memeriksa pencapaian sektor eksport elektronik negara China ke
Amerika Syarikat, Kesatuan Europah dan Jepun berbanding dengan negara-
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negara Asia NIE di antara 1988 sehingga 2001. Kajian ini mengunakan analis
“dynamic shift-share” kerana kelemahan yang terdapat di dalam analisis
“static shift-share” Kajian menunjuk bahawa China telah wujud sebagai
pengeksport barang elektronik yang”penting walaupun kedudukannya tidak
utama. Selepas tahun 1995, negara China dan Malaysia telah muncul sebagai
pengeksport elektronik yang penting setanding dengan Singapura dan Hong
Kong, untuk memastikan proses “catch-up”. Tiada satupun negara NIE
menguasai pengeksport elektronik. Walau bagaimanapun negara-negara
ASEAN yang bertaraf rendah pembangunannya menghadapi tentangan hebat
daripada China di sektor penggilangan yang bernilai rendah. Tetapi negara-
negara yang telah muncul masih mempunyai peluang untuk memperbaiki
kedudukan dan menambahkan nilai sektor tersebut sebelum China menutup
jarak pengeluaran hasil. Ekonomi negara-negara tersebut akan beruntung
selama China memperbesarkan sektor perusahan dan sektor servis.
Kata kunci: Asia NIE; China; ekspot elektronik; ‘shift-share’.
INTRODUCTION
China has enjoyed remarkable trade growth over the past two decades,
with exports expanding by almost 13% per annum on average between
1986 and 2001, and 20% between 1986 and 1995 (International
Enterprise Singapore). This coincided with substantial changes in the
international landscape since the mid-1980s as globalisation of the
world economy led to intense competition in the east Asian region
and significant changes in export competitiveness.
These developments have been heightened by the re-entry of China
into the global economy in the 1990s, a process begun with domestic
reforms in 1978, but catalysed by China’s accession to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in 2002. The result has been an acceleration in the
process of dismantling its trade barriers, opening its market up to
foreign services, and reducing the weight of state-controlled enterprises
in the economy.
The spectre of the ‘Chinese threat’ has forced other countries in the
Asian region to re-assess their own international competitiveness.1
Whilst some observers point to the opportunities China presents as a
market for exports, a source of tourism earnings and indigenous foreign
direct investment (FDI), and its potential to act as a ‘locomotive’ for
regional demand and a stabiliser against downswings in global
demand, others are less optimistic.
Rapid growth in GDP 0f 9.4% on an annual average basis since 1985
(Table 1) and fast ‘catch-up’ based on low costs, a seemingly endlessw
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reserve army of underemployed agricultural workers, technicians from
the communist era, and a rapidly rising pool of ambitious English-
speaking graduates, has transformed China into the workshop of the
world, particularly in lower-end manufacturing such as textiles,
bicycles, shoes, and furniture. But China is also catching up in
electronics which have increased from a negligible base in 1987 to
account for 19% of global exports by 2001 (Figure 1). China has been
likened to a giant vacuum cleaner ‘sucking up’ the lion’s share of FDI
inflows into the developing countries (Figure 2), attracted by rising
incomes in its vast home market, especially in the southern Pearl River
delta.
Figure 1
China’s share of electronics in total exports 1987 to 2001
(International Enterprise Singapore).
Figure 2
China’s share of developing country FDI inflows 1985 to 2001
(ADB, 2002).
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At the same time, because of its rising foreign exchange reserves, which
were US$169 billion in 2000 (Asian Development Bank, 2002),
underpinned by an undervalued currency which has enabled it to
maintain a competitive edge in exports, China is accused of neo-
mercantilism.
China is also seen as a potential new source of shocks to the Asian
region as its excess capacity and low costs translate into enhanced price
competition and a fall in profit margins and in the value of
manufacturing assets. Using the trade to GDP ratio as a measure of
openness to international trade, China is still relatively closed in
comparison to the exceptionally open Asian NIEs (Table 1), with a trade
to GDP ratio of 44% in 2000, and its ratio of domestic consumption to
world consumption is quite small.2 Yet the impact of China on its
neighbours is magnified by the absolute size of its exports and imports
which were US$249 billion and $225 billion, respectively, in 2000 (Asian
Development Bank, 2002) and the growing interdependence in the
Asian region as China becomes more integrated into the local trade
matrix as both an export market and source of imports.
How real is the Chinese threat in electronics to the Asian NIEs in the
major developed country markets of the world?
This paper uses a dynamic version of shift-share analysis to re-assess
China’s export performance in electronics exports to the USA, European
Union (EU), and Japan in relation to Singapore, Hong Kong, South
Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, which have become close competitors
in these markets. Shift-share is a relatively simple technique with a
number of well-documented shortcomings but it has been proven to
be a useful descriptive tool for isolating trends in regional performance
and for supplying data for policymakers to interpret changes in the
industrial structure of their economies.
Although there has been some discussion about the longer-term
economic challenge posed by China to Japan, the focus in this paper is
on Japan as a major export market for China and the other Asian NIEs.
Also, in the absence of easily obtainable and internationally comparable
trade data at a more disaggregated level, most comparative studies on
the east and south-east Asian economies have been restricted to the
one or two-digit standard international trade classification (SITC). By
contrast, the present paper looks at five three-digit level categories of
electronics, as well as electronics in aggregate.
We begin with some background on China’s export performance
relative to the NIEs since the mid-1980s. This is followed by a discussionw
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of the literature and the methodology used in this paper. We complete
the paper with our empirical results and some concluding remarks
and qualifications.
CHINA AND THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALISED ASIAN
ECONOMIES
Although there are a number of ways to group the more successful
economies of east and south-east Asia in a rapidly changing world
economy, with the exception of China, the other NIEs in this region
have generally matured at approximately the same pace from the mid-
1980s to the present time and have become increasingly competitive
as a group, especially in the markets of the USA, Japan, and the EU.
Some of the economic characteristics of these Asian NIEs are
summarised in Table 1. All have undergone a period of rapid economic
growth and structural change since the mid-1980s. The rising share of
manufacturing output in GDP and corresponding fall in the share of
agriculture is an indicator of the extent of industrialisation achieved
over this period. The clear exception is Hong Kong, but this is explained
by the relocation of much of its manufacturing base across the border
into China from the mid-1980s onwards as it de facto re-integrated
with the mainland, a process which was accelerated by de jure
reunification in 1997. In terms of income per capita, all have achieved
a substantial level of economic development.
Table 1
Comparative Indicators for China and the NIEs 1985-2000.
1985 1990 1995 2000
China:
   GNP per capita (US$) 267 314 574 844
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 28 27 21 16
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 39 37 42 44
   Trade to GDP (%) 25 32 40 44
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0 1985-0
8.9 10.7 8.3 9.4
Hong Kong:
   GDP per capita (US$) 6374 13091 23061 24407
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 22 18 8 6
   Trade to GDP (%) 184 229 279 284
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0 1985-0
8.6 5.2 3.6 5.8w
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1985 1990 1995 2000
South Korea:
   GNP per capita (US$) 2179 5817 10772 8609
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 13 9 6 8
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 29 29 29 31
   Trade to GDP (percent) 67 54 53 81
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0 1985-00
9.6 7.7 5.1 7.5
Malaysia:
   GNP per capita (US$) 1891 2376 4033 3531
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 20 15 13 9
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 20 24 26 34
   Trade to GDP (percent) 84 133 170 201
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0 1985-0
6.4 9.4 4.9 6.9
Singapore:
   GNP per capita (US$) 6967 15846 24337 24379
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 23 27 24 26
   Trade to GDP (%) 277 308 292 296
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0 1985-0
7.8 9.1 6.7 7.9
Taiwan:
   GNP per capita (US$) 3287 8040 12287 13458
   Agriculture/GDP (%) 6 4 3 2
   Manufacturing/GDP (%) 38 33 28 26
   Trade to GDP (%) 82 76 81 93
   Real GDP Growth (%) 1985-9 1990-5 1996-0   1985-0
10.1 6.8 5.8 7.6
Notes: The trade to GDP ratio is exports plus imports in local currency as a
ratio of nominal GDP; conversions to US dollars use end of period
exchange rates; the ratio of manufacturing to GDP for China includes
mining, electricity, gas and water, while for Singapore agriculture
includes mining; the real GDP growth rates are calculated from IMF
IFS data (1995=100) except for Taiwan which was rebased to 1995 from
ADB data;
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2002); International Monetary Fund (2002).
From the trade perspective, the Asian NIEs became increasingly open
to international trade and capital flows from the early 1980s with high
trade to GDP ratios and adopted similar outward-oriented trade
(continued Table 1)
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strategies and moved steadily over time into more technology and
capital-intensive exports, especially electronics. During the 1980s and
1990s they also became more interdependent in trade and capital flows
as a group and increasingly competed in similar categories of goods
and markets. Not surprisingly, the USA, Japan, and the EU are
important markets for these countries in electronics, both individually,
and as a bloc (Table 2). By 2000, electronics accounted for approximately
70% of Singapore’s exports to the USA, Japan and the EU (excluding
re-exports), followed by Malaysia (60%), Taiwan (57%), South Korea
(41%), China (22%), and Hong Kong (15%).
Table 2
Exports of Electronics by the Asian NIEs to the USA, EU and Japan
in 2000.
752 759 7613 764 776 Electronics
% of exports
China 5.9 1.6 7.9 4.8 1.3 21.5
South Korea 9.3 8.8 2.8 6.7 13.7 41.3
Malaysia 11.1 14.6 10.5 7.2 16.8 60.2
Singapore 30.7 14.6 1.4 2.9 20.8 70.4
Hong Kong 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.4 11.6 14.5
Taiwan 22.0 13.8 1.2 5.7 14.7 57.4
Total Reference 12.5 8.2 5.0 5.4 10.6 41.7
countries
Notes: Exports for Singapore and Hong Kong refer to domestic exports; 752
is disk drives, printers and PCs, 759 is printed circuit boards, 7613 is
consumer electronics, 764 is telecommunications equipment, 776 is
semiconductors, total electronics includes SITC 752,759,7613,764,776.
Source: International Enterprise Singapore.
Whilst China has not been a traditional competitor of the other NIEs,
it is fast becoming one especially in the late 1990s, primarily as a result
of its low cost base and surge in inward FDI. In 2000 income per capita
for China was only one quarter that of Malaysia, and only 3% of Hong
Kong and Singapore (Table 1). The share of agriculture in GDP has
fallen substantially since 1985 to about 16% but this is still noticeably
higher than the other NIEs, and its manufacturing sector, which is
dominated by lower value-added industries, has a higher weight in
national income than in the manufacturing-oriented countries of
Malaysia and South Korea, and the more service-oriented Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore. Whilst China has become more open tow
w
w
.ij
m
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y
74     IJMS 14 (1), 67-97 (2007)
international trade, on conventional criteria, it is still less open than
the other NIEs. However, there are problems in measuring China’s
trade with the rest of the world because of its re-export trade with
Hong Kong (Ho, 1998; Fung & Lau, 1998).
Furthermore, at the start of our sample period (as for Malaysia) China’s
exports were concentrated mainly on primary products (SITC 012 and
34) and (as for Hong Kong and Taiwan) lower value-added
manufactured goods (SITC 689), such as clothing accessories and
textiles (Table 3). Nonetheless, China’s overall performance and
structural transformation in the last decade has been staggering. All
the NIEs grew rapidly by world standards in the late 1980s (Table 1),
and growth slowed for all after 1996, but China’s performance stands
above the rest in the 1990s, as the older Tigers began to slow down,
particularly Hong Kong and Taiwan. China’s share of developing
country inward FDI more than doubled in the early 1990s compared
to the second half of the 1980s, and accounted for approximately one
fifth on average between 1995 and 2000 and almost one half of the
flow to Asia (excluding Japan). Japan and India have seen their shares
increase since 1985, but all of China’s other competitors in the Asian
region have seen a fall in shares in the 1995-1999 period compared to
1985-1989 (World Investment Report, 2002).
Rapid growth and industrialisation in the 1990s has thus translated
into a deepening and a widening of China’s manufacturing base and a
shift in focus towards higher value-added exports, such as machinery
and equipment (SITC 7), which by 2000 accounted for half of China’s
total exports (Table 3). China’s import and export structure has also
changed profoundly (Table 4) as its dependence on Japan for imports
declined in favour of the regional partners Hong Kong and South
Korea, and the importance of the USA and Europe as export markets
increased, largely at the expense of Japan. By 2000 the USA, Japan and
the EU together accounted for approximately half of Chinese exports.
As far as electronics specifically is concerned, China’s share in total
exports to developed country markets is still dwarfed by the other
NIEs (Table 2), with the exception of service-oriented Hong Kong.
However, in absolute terms, the electronics and information technology
industry is now China’s largest industry and in terms of turnover China
currently ranks third in the world (MTI-TDB, 2001).
There have also been significant changes in the export product-mix in
China’s electronics industry (Table 5). Not only has there been a
significant increase in the importance of electronics as a whole in total
exports from a negligible base in 1985, to about 22% by 2000, butw
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particularly important has been the rise in the share of consumer
electronics to almost 8%, and disk drives, printers and PCs to 5.9%.
On the other hand, printed circuit boards and semiconductors still only
account for 1.6 % and 1.3% respectively.
Table 3
China’s Export Structure Compared to the NIEs, 1985 to 2000.
Commodity (% of total exports) SITC 1985 1990 1995 2000
China 012 23.9 16.9 10.6 7.0
34 26.5 8.7 3.9 3.2
5 5.0 6.0 6.1 4.9
689 41.7 59.4 21.1 33.1
7 2.8 9.0 58.3 51.8
Hong Kong 012 3.0 3.5 3.6 2.6
34 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
5 0.9 2.9 3.9 3.5
689 73.6 68.4 62.6 68.7
7 21.9 24.9 29.4 24.8
South Korea 012 5.1 4.8 2.8 2.6
34 3.2 1.1 2.0 5.4
5 3.1 3.9 7.2 7.9
689 51.1 50.9 34.7 25.9
7 37.6 39.3 52.5 58.1
Malaysia 012 23.5 18.8 9.1 4.8
34 44.4 25.5 13.8 13.3
5 1.1 1.6 3.0 3.8
689 12.4 18.5 18.9 15.8
7 18.6 35.7 55.1 62.5
Singapore 012 10.0 7.4 4.9 3.3
34 35.8 18.9 8.7 9.9
5 5.4 6.27 5.9 6.9
689 15.5 17.2 14.7 12.9
7 33.0 50.1 65.7 67.4
Taiwan 012 7.5 5.8 5.2 2.5
34 1.8 0.6 0.7 1.1
5 2.5 4.1 6.8 6.2
689 60.3 50.4 39.2 32.6
7 27.9 39.1 48.1 58.4
Key: 012=Food, live animals, beverages and tobacco, crude materials
34=Mineral fuels, animal, vegetable oils and fats
5=Chemicals
689=Basic manufactures, miscellaneous manufactured goods,
unclassified goods
7= Machines, transport equipment
Source: Asian Development Bank (2002).w
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Table 4
China’s Major Export Markets and Sources of Imports 1985 to 2000.
Exports Imports
1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000
(% of exports) (% of imports)
USA 8.5 8.5 16.6 26.9 12.2 12.2 12.2 8.7
Japan 22.3 14.7 19.1 14.6 35.7 14.2 21.9 16.6
France 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.8 1.7 3.1 2.0 1.6
Germany 2.7 3.3 3.8 4.1 5.8 5.5 6.1 4.3
Italy 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.6 - - - -
Netherlands 1.2 1.5 2.2 2.3 - - - -
UK 1.3 1.1 1.9 1.9 - - - -
Hong Kong 26.2 43.3 24.2 20.7 11.2 27.1 6.5 17.2
S. Korea - 0.7 4.5 3.2 - 0.4 7.8 9.2
Malaysia - - - - 0.5 1.6 1.6 1.9
Singapore 7.5 3.2 2.3 2.0 0.6 1.6 2.6 2.4
Australia - - - - 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.9
Russia - - - - - - 2.9 2.6
Source: Asian Development Bank (2002).
Table 5
The Composition of China’s Exports of Electronics to the USA, Japan
and the EU from1990 to 2000
% of exports 1990 1995 2000
Disk drives, printers, PCs (SITC 752) 0.01 2.03 5.9
Printed circuit boards (SITC 759) 0.12 1.12 1.6
Consumer electronics (SITC 761-3) 0.75 3.75 7.9
Telecommunications equipment (SITC 764) 0.17 2.69 4.8
Semiconductors (SITC 776) 0.06 0.46 1.3
Total electronics 1.11 10.05 21.5
Source: International Enterprise Singapore.
The perception that China is a threat to the NIEs stems largely from its
extraordinary growth in exports and rising share in key developed
country markets, including electronics. Table 6 shows the growth profile
of China’s exports compared to the NIEs over three periods: 1985-1989,
1990-1995 and 1996-2000, and changes in market shares for each country
as a percentage of the share of the group as a whole.w
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In the first period, all the Asian NIEs grew fast globally and into the
developed country markets. In the second period, China and Malaysia
were the star performers, particularly in the US market, but Singapore
and South Korea also achieved respectable growth. Only Taiwan and
Hong Kong performed poorly in comparison.3 Export growth slowed
dramatically for the group as a whole in the most recent phase on the
back of three external shocks. Exports of electronics moderated sharply
in 1996 due to a serious supply glut in the global electronics industry.
Before the region could fully recover, trade was further disrupted by
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. After a year of exuberant
growth in the international technology sector and the world economy
in 2000, east Asia was again hard hit by a major correction in the global
information technology market, precipitated by a synchronised
slowdown in the US, the EU, and Japan. Taken individually, growth
was moderate for South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, but China again
performed much better than its competitors, while Hong Kong grew
at a negative rate and Singapore managed only 3% globally and a
negative 0.5% in the US market.
As far as market shares are concerned, China’s performance is equally
impressive, increasing its share of the Asian NIEs global exports from
22% in the first period to 30% in the third, and more than doubling its
share in the US and total developed country markets to 28% and 32%
respectively. Malaysia and Taiwan also increased their shares in global
and developed country markets but in a much less spectacular fashion,
and Taiwan’s shares actually fell between the second and third periods.
Singapore’s shares remained remarkably stable over the three periods,
while South Korea saw a significant decline in the US and Japanese
markets from a high initial base and Hong Kong’s shares in global and
developed markets declined from 14% and 16% in the first period to
around 4% in the most recent period.
Has China’s rapid export growth and rising share in developed country
markets since 1985 been the result of increasing competitiveness? Or
does it reflect a natural process of shifting comparative advantage or
market diversification, or just several cyclical downturns which
reduced the competitiveness of China’s more export-oriented
competitors? The rest of the paper will look more closely at this
phenomenon with the help of shift-share analysis which goes beyond
the growth rates and shares in Table 6 to assess China’s performance
against what might have been expected in comparison with a reference
group of competitors and looks specifically at the electronics industry.w
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Table 6
China’s Average Export Growth and Market Shares Compared to the
NIEs 1985-2000.
1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2000
Country Export Export Export Export Export Export
Share Growth  Share Growth Share Growth
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
China:
   USA 6.5 19.3 14.9 35.9 27.8 16.3
   EU 17.3 27.5 18.7 24.0 29.7 15.2
   Japan 26.2 12.0 30.4 23.1 42.5 8.5
   Total 14.4 15.6 19.9 26.7 32.1 13.0
   Global 22.2 19.8 24.2 19.2 30 11.4
HongKong:
    USA 19.1 6.1 9.7 -2.4 5.2 -2.4
   EU 21.2 18.3 9.9 -2.9 4.9 -4.0
   Japan 4.2 31.6 2.9 -1.0 1.3 -14.5
   Total 15.8 11.6 8.0 -2.6 4.1 -4.1
   Global 13.6 15.0 7.9 0.7 4.0 -4.5
S. Korea:
   USA 34.9 18.6 23.4 3.1 19.5 10.3
   EU 24.9 25.6 19.1 13.3 20.1 7.8
   Japan 31.9 32.3 26.4 4.7 20.1 5.5
   Total 31.5 23.4 22.6 5.8 19.8 8.0
   Global 26.4 20.5 21.9 12.6 22.4 6.9
Malaysia:
   USA 6.3 23.4 10.3 22.1 12.2 5.9
   EU 11.5 15.4 11.7 17.7 13.1 5.2
   Japan 15.0 2.7 12.5 15.4 12.9 8.4
   Total 9.9 12.6 11.2 18.6 12.7 5.9
   Global 10.9 13.6 11.8 19.8 12.9 6.2
Singapore:
   USA 12.1 23.3 13.9 12.5 12.9 -0.5
  EU 10.3 29.5 13.4 17.4 13.3 1.8
   Japan 8.3 13.9 8.0 15.6 7.2 3.5
   Total 10.6 22.5 11.9 14.5 11.6 0.6
    Global 11.5 18.0 12.2 16.3 11.2 3.0
Taiwan:
   USA 21.1 0.8 27.9 1.7 22.4 5.8
   EU 14.8 18.0 20.6 6.3 18.8 8.9
   Japan 14.4 14.5 19.6 7.1 15.9 7.3
   Total 17.8 6.7 23.4 3.9 19.7 6.6
   Global 15.4 11.2 22.1 9.2 19.4 6.3w
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1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2000
Country Export Export Export Export Export Export
Share Growth  Share Growth Share Growth
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Reference:
   USA 100 33.6 100 8.6 100 7.9
   EU 100 32.6 100 17.8 100 8.2
   Japan 100 28.6 100 12.1 100 6.6
   Total 100 31.6 100 11.1 100 7.5
   Global 100 29.1 100 13.5 100 6.9
Notes: The export share numbers are the shares of each country as a
percentage of the overall share of the reference group; the total figures
refer to the sum of the USA, EU and Japan; for Taiwan the first period
averages begin in 1987.
Source: International Enterprise Singapore.
Table 7
China’s Average Export Differential by Major Market 1988-2000.
Export Differential US$ millions 1988-1995 1996-2000
Disk drives, Printers, PCs
USA -102.63 239.8
Japan -142.63 -195.8
EU -102.88 144.8
Total -370.88 152.8
Printed circuit boards
USA -100.75 -217.6
Japan -40 -294.2
EU -69 -217.2
Total -239.13 -706.8
Consumer electronics
USA 109.88 193.4
Japan -17.75 2.00
EU 88.88 869.2
Total 203 1045.4
Telecoms equip
USA 72.25 -73.6
Japan 33.38 88.2
EU -25.75 202.6
Total 105.25 169.2
(continued Table 6)
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Export Differential US$ millions 1988-1995 1996-2000
Semiconductors
USA -255.75 -93.4
Japan -169 -188.8
EU -168.25 -141.6
Total -609.63 -386.6
Electronics
USA -276.88 48.4
Japan -361.5 -588.8
EU -276.75 857.8
Total -911.75 274.2
Table 8
The NIEs Total Export Differential 1988-2000
Export Differential 1988-1995 1996-2000
US$ millions
Hong Kong
Disk drives, Printers, PCs -281.38 -183.8
Printed circuit boards -126.25 -201.6
Consumer electronics -137.88 -57
Telecoms equip -98.25 -115.6
Semiconductors -154.38 -16.6
Electronics -798.34 -574.8
Export Differential 1988-1995 1996-2000
US$ millions
S. Korea
Disk drives, Printers, PCs -433.34 127.2
Printed circuit boards -365.75 673.4
Consumer electronics -251.13 -201.6
Telecoms equip -17.25 183
Semiconductors 476.38 -417.6
Electronics -591.25 364.44
Export Differential 1988-1995 1996-2000
US$ millions
Malaysia
Disk drives, Printers, PCs -84.5 191.6
Printed circuit boards 120.5 484
Consumer electronics 484.88 -196.4
Telecoms equip 124.88 49.6
Semiconductors 359.63 -103
Electronics 1005.5 2611
(continued Table 7)
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Export Differential 1988-1995 1996-2000
US$ millions
Singapore
Disk drives, Printers, PCs 1099.95 -1059.2
Printed circuit boards 376.75 -423
Consumer electronics 26.38 -392.22
Telecoms equip 23.5 -277.6
Semiconductors 171.88 329.8
Electronics 1698 -1139
Export Differential 1988-1995 1996-2000
US$ millions
Taiwan
Disk drives, Printers, PCs 121 771
Printed circuit boards 233.63 174
Consumer electronics -325.25 -198
Telecoms equip -138.13 -8.4
Semiconductors -243.88 719.2
Electronics -403.13 1458
LITERATURE REVIEW
Shift-share has been used extensively to analyse differences between
regional and national growth rates in variables such as export growth,
employment and productivity (Richardson, 1978; Esteban-Marquillas,
1972; Fothergill & Gudgin, 1979; Haynes & Machunda, 1987; Hayward
& Erickson, 1995). Although a useful descriptive tool for isolating trends
in regional performance and for supplying data for policymakers to
interpret changes in the industrial structure of their economies, it is a
technique which needs to be handled with some care.
The primary function of shift-share, in the present context, is to ascertain
whether there are any patterns in the time profiles of the export
differentials or their constituents across countries and product groups
over a reasonable period of time. The choice of time horizon, reference
group, and destination market are, therefore, critical. Focusing unduly
on individual years may give a somewhat myopic picture of a county’s
export performance and be unduly influenced by exceptional years or
errors in the primary data and the interpretation of the results will
differ if the benchmark group against which a country is being
compared is changed or the exports are destined to a different market.
Herschede (1991), for example, compared the export performance of
(continued Table 8)
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China, the east Asian NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and ASEAN
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand) in the
Japanese market over a five year period between 1982 and 1987 and
concluded that ASEAN’s relative failure was due as much to the strong
performance of the NIEs in the Japanese market as to the emergence
of China. Voon (1998), on the other hand, included China in the
reference group together with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, looked at export competitiveness in the US market over a
longer period (1982-1994) and found evidence of some rivalry between
China and ASEAN4. Similarly, Singapore did worse in a study by
Wilson and Wong (1999) when the reference group is ASEAN4 plus
Singapore between 1986 and 1995 than in a later paper by Wilson (2000)
over a similar period (1983-1995) when competitors including three
other ‘older’ tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea) as well as ASEAN
partners Malaysia and Thailand.
A second problem relates to the time dimension used in shift-share
analysis. Previous studies using shift-share methods to investigate
export competitiveness are comparative static in that they only consider
changes in exports between the beginning and the terminal years of
the time period under investigation for example, Herschede (1991),
DBSBank (1992), Voon (1998) and Wilson and Goh (1998). The standard
procedure is to use the industry mix at the start of the period to calculate
the industry mix effect over the whole period, or to adopt an arbitrary
compromise by averaging over the period in some way. This is perfectly
reasonable for capturing the general picture but can be a problem if
there are significant changes in industrial structures over time as one
would expect for the economies considered in this paper. Failure to
take into account changes in the size of a country’s total exports over
the period can also lead to problems if these exports grow faster or
slower than those of the reference group (Barff & Knight, 1988). Only
by applying an annual growth rate to a country’s exports at the
beginning of the year can the ‘share effect’ be accurately measured.
For example, in two comparative static studies of Singapore’s export
competitiveness compared to the ‘dynamic Asian economies’
(Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea) between 1983 and
1995 by DBSBank (1992) and Wilson and Goh (1998), Singapore had
came across as dominant in all manufacturing categories except in
apparel and clothing. But if a dynamic approach is adopted, as in
Wilson (2000) for the same sample and period, it is clear that Singapore
had begun to lose its competitive lead in all categories of manufacturing
except office/data processing machines and organic chemicals by the
early 1990s.w
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In this paper, therefore, dynamic shift-share analysis is used. This
variation of shift share allows growth rates and industry mixes to vary
over the time period and so takes these factors into account by
automatically updating the industry mix component each year and
allowing for changes in the size of total exports in each of the countries
in the sample. The results of shift-share analysis are also sensitive to
the level of aggregation chosen. Most comparative studies on the east
and south-east Asian economies have been restricted to the one or two-
digit standard international trade classification (SITC). Whilst this gives
us the general picture within very broad categories, it needs to be
supplemented by further decomposition to narrow down the range of
product categories which constitute a significant proportion of each
country’s exports and to capture areas of specialisation and unwrap
the pattern of concentration or diversification within the product
groups themselves. For example, SITC category 75, which incorporates
office and data processing machines, incorporates a wide range of
electronics and related items, not all of which will be relevant to all
competitors. In the Voon (1998) paper referred to above, which is based
on a one-digit classification, Singapore’s only positive export
differential between 1990 and 1994 was in primary products! Of course
Singapore’s competitors were ‘catching-up’ in manufactured goods
but to get beyond the catch-up effect requires a further penetration
into at least the two-digit level in SITC categories 5, 7, and 9. By contrast,
we look at five three-digit level categories of electronics, as well as
electronics in aggregate.4
A final problem concerns the distinction between gross and ‘domestic’
export data and discrepancies in reported data. For most countries
where the import content of exports is relatively small, the use of total
export data would be perfectly adequate to capture the contribution
that exports make to the domestic economy and differences in absolute
size between countries (China’s exports are huge in comparison with
Singapore and Hong Kong). However, in the case of Singapore, since a
substantial part of its trade (particularly with other Asian countries)
has historically taken the form of entrepot exports, we use domestic
exports instead, which automatically excludes re-exports. This gives a
more accurate representation of changes in export competitiveness
insofar as it captures the exports that Singapore generates from its own
industrial base (Sen, 2000).
A similar problem arises with respect to Hong Kong, which reverted
to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The rather special characteristics of
the Hong Kong economy mean that it continues to be treated
independently in empirical work on trade. But, since a large proportion
of Hong Kong’s manufacturing production, particularly processingw
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and assembly, has been shifted to mainland China since the early 1980s,
this tends to overstate China’s bilateral exports to the rest of the world
which are measured inclusive of the Hong Kong component, and
understate those of Hong Kong itself (Ho, 1998; Fung & Lau, 1998).
Again we use domestic exports.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the present context, the objective is to compare China’s export
performance in electronics against a reference group which includes
the main Asian NIE competitors using a dynamic version of shift-share
analysis. Details on the precise methodology used to calculate the
results can be found in Appendix 1. The focus here is on export growth
over a period of time where the regions are the competing east Asian
NIEs (China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan)
and the nation is the combined group of these countries. Shift-share is
applied to five three-digit export categories of electronics as well as to
aggregate electronics exports for the six reference economies selling to
the USA, EU, and Japan between 1988 and 2001. The export data was
extracted from the UN Combase online database.
The Export Differential
Table 7 shows China’s average export differential (or shift effect) to
the three developed country markets for electronics as a whole and by
three-digit sub-category over the periods 1988 to 1995 and 1996 to 2000.
These differentials capture any difference between China’s performance
and that part of the total change in exports due to the rate of export
growth of the reference group as a whole (the share effect) and are
measured in absolute US dollars. A positive differential implies an
improvement in competitiveness relative to the reference group as a
whole and a negative value constitutes a deterioration in
competitiveness.
The results suggest that China has now emerged as a serious contender
in electronics exports, especially in consumer electronics,
telecommunications equipment and in disk drives, printers and PCs
(except in the Japanese market).
However, China’s position has not been a dominant one, primarily
due to the uneven performance across product categories. In terms of
printed circuit boards and semiconductors, which contain some higher
end exports, China has not made any significant impact in developedw
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country markets when measured against the performance of the other
NIEs. This is not surprising since China’s manufactured exports in
general are still relatively concentrated in lower-end categories of
products, such as clothing and textiles compared to the other more
mature industrialised reference economies. High tech exports,
including aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, and scientific
equipment constituted only 18% of China’s manufacturing exports in
2000, substantially less than the’other more established manufacturers
of Malaysia (58.2%) and South Korea (34.2%) (World Bank, 2002).
Table 8 summarises the shift-share results for the other NIEs. Taking
Tables 7 and 8 together for electronics as a whole, the principal gainers
after 1995 summed across all three export markets appear to be
newcomers China and Malaysia at the expense of the older Tigers Hong
Kong and Singapore. Hong Kong is clearly no longer a serious
contender in any category of electronics, while for Singapore, the loss
of competitiveness appears to be more recent. Its overall electronics
exports performed well between 1988 and 1995 in all markets compared
to the reference economies coinciding with a period when there was
substantial foreign investment in the electronics sector and positive
spillovers from other economies in the region, which were expanding
strongly over this period. These were the “golden” years for Singapore’s
electronics exports which benefited from first-mover advantage in
southeast Asia by switching into higher value-added and capital-
intensive electronics exports earlier than her competitors and gaining
a significant foothold as an important production and export centre.
However, the general trend of positive net shifts for Singapore
electronics seems to have reversed around 1996 in all three export
markets. In fact, Singapore was the only economy among the reference
economies to experience continuous negative export differentials
between 1996 and 2001 (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2002). The
only bright spot for Singapore was semiconductor exports which
experienced positive average differentials over all periods.
In the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the results are less clear-cut.
For South Korea, a negative differential in electronics prior to 1996
turned positive in the second period but was insufficient to offset the
earlier negatives as far as the whole period is concerned. But apart
from consumer electronics and semiconductors, there were small
positive differentials in the other categories in the second period.
Taiwan does well in disk drives, printers, and PCs in both periods and
in semiconductors and printed circuit boards in the second period,
but closer examination of the data suggests that the positive differentials
overall are largely determined by sizeable absolute gains in the Japanese
market in the late 1990s. After the 1998 Asian financial crisis, manyw
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Japanese electronics firms began to outsource their manufacturing
operations and Taiwanese contract manufacturers were the main
beneficiaries.
Although China and Malaysia stood out in terms of overall
performance in electronics since the mid-1990s, no single reference
economy appears to have dominated all categories of electronics
exports. Malaysia and Taiwan (and maybe South Korea) are
competitors with China in disk drives, printers, and PCs; Taiwan in
consumer electronics (positive differentials from 1996 are offset by a
large negative value in 2000); and Malaysia and South Korea in
telecommunications equipment. In the higher value-added sectors of
semiconductors and printed circuit boards, where so far China has
not been so competitive, Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia dominate
the former5 while Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan are still the key
players in the latter.
Decomposition of the Export Differential
A key feature of shift-share analysis is its ability to identify both the
overall pattern of a country’s export growth relative to a reference
group, and to decompose this performance in terms of its export
structure, competitiveness (growth rate), and the interplay between
export structure and competitiveness (see Appendix 1). In general, a
favourable industrial mix effect (IME) means that a country’s share of
exports in fast growing industries is larger than the reference group or
its share in slow growing industries is smaller. On the other hand, a
positive competitive effect (CE) would result if a given sector grows
faster than the rate for the group as a whole; and a positive interactive
effect (IE) would be indicative of a favourable combination of economic
structure and competitiveness.
Appendix 2 decomposes China’s average export differential over the
two time periods and three developed country markets. China’s switch
from negative to positive export differentials since the early 1990s,
especially in consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment
(and to some extent in disk drives, printers, and PCs) has
overwhelmingly been driven by a strong CE effect, while the IME has
generally been negative. The CE effect was positive in all product
categories in the first period and negative only for Japan in printed
circuit boards in the second period. The IME was negative in all
categories in the first period and positive only for telecommunications
equipment in Japan, and consumer electronics in the EU and USA in
the second period. This combination of a strong positive CE but a less-w
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than-optimal industry mix resulted in large and negative IE’s for China
in the first period, but in the second period some positive interaction
effects were beginning to appear in consumer electronics, printed circuit
boards, and telecommunications equipment, but they are not very large
in magnitude.
However, if China can sustain rapid growth in exports and is able to
consolidate its industrial base, China’s overall competitiveness can be
expected to improve substantially in the future. Its low cost structure,
an increasingly skilled workforce, and an influx of technology and
management skills associated with large FDI inflows, together with
its entry into the WTO, places China in a very favourable position.
CONCLUSION
The object of this paper was to apply dynamic shift-share analysis to
examine the export performance of China’s electronics sector in relation
to a reference group of east Asian NIEs which have become increasingly
close competitors in the export markets of the USA, EU, and Japan
between 1988 and 2001. Previous studies using shift-share methods
have tended to focus on the one or two-digit export classification and
have adopted a comparative static perspective. By contrast, the present
paper has looked at five three-digit electronics categories, as well as
electronics as a whole, adjusted total export data for re-exports where
appropriate, and has applied a more methodologically robust
‘dynamic’ version of the shift-share methodology.
Our findings suggest that China has now emerged as a serious
contender in the export market for electronics goods but its position
has not been a dominant one. The main gains have been in consumer
electronics and telecommunications equipment, and to a lesser extent
in disk-drives, printers and PCs, but in printed circuit boards and
semiconductors, which contain higher-end products, China has not
yet gained a significant stronghold in developed country markets, at
least to the extent that the growth in overall exports and increase in
market shares might suggest.
Moreover, China’s switch from negative to positive export differentials
in the overall electronics market since the early 1990s has been largely
underpinned by strong export growth rather than a favourable industry
mix.6 Nonetheless, if China can sustain rapid growth in exports and is
able consolidate its industrial base, its overall export competitiveness
can be expected to improve in the future. Its low cost structure, anw
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increasingly skilled workforce and an influx of technology and
management skills associated with large FDI inflows, together with
its entry into the WTO, places China in a very favourable position.
Has China become a serious threat to east Asian competitors in
electronics exports?
For electronics as a whole, our results suggest that the principal gainers
after 1995 across all three export markets appear to be the relative
newcomers China and Malaysia at the expense of the older Tigers:
Hong Kong and Singapore, with more ambiguous implications for
South Korea and Taiwan. However, no single reference economy seems
to have dominated all categories of electronics exports by the second
half of the 1990s.
An important question is how long it will take before China catches
up in higher value-added production and how successfully the
competitors use this breathing space to make the necessary structural
adjustments. In the east Asian region, the less developed members of
ASEAN would appear to be at most risk in the immediate future since
they compete head on with China in lower-end manufacturing and
for FDI, and are in danger of being ‘leapfrogged’ in the value-added
chain. China has already overtaken ASEAN as a low cost export
production base and attractor of FDI. Much will depend on how quickly
wages in China rise with productivity increase. Given a large potential
labour supply from the rural sector, it could be some time.
The problem here is not simply higher relative costs in ASEAN but the
fact that they are still competing head-on with China both in their
domestic markets and in third markets, including lower-end electronics
goods. Much will depend on their ability to raise their value-added
and find more niches which are complementary to China’s
manufacturing production rather than competing with it, and to
improve the quality of their infrastructure and the transfer of
technology from multinational corporations (MNCs). Indonesia, for
example, has been trying to establish itself as an attractive offshore
base for Singapore’s lower-end manufacturing under the umbrella of
the 2003 free trade agreement between Singapore and the USA. The
past record of Malaysia and Thailand in areas such as the automotive
industry suggests that they are better placed than Indonesia and the
Philippines, and the least developed members of ASEAN – Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, but even Malaysia is finding it difficult
to broaden its manufacturing base from over-reliance on low cost
manufacturing and natural resources, and increase the technology
transfer from MNCs.w
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Notwithstanding political tensions, the Asian tigers with close
proximity to China are probably better placed to adjust to China’s
manufacturing dominance since they are no longer low cost back-end
producers competing in commodities, but are already competing in
front-end marketing, design, product innovation/differentiation,
quality semiconductors, logistics/hub activities, and are integrating
more successfully with China and finding complementarities.7 A large
proportion of Taiwan’s electronic products are now manufactured in
China including those of electronics firm ACER, and South Korean
firms, such as Samsung, are also producing in the mainland.
Singapore does not have the advantage of geographic proximity to
China but has an impressive record for adjusting to changes in the
external environment, is currently nurturing high value-added
manufacturing clusters in electronics, chemicals and bio-medical
sciences, diversifying its exports to give them a more global dimension,
and is continuing to promote itself as a premier financial centre (Peebles
& Wilson, 2002).
These conclusions, of course, need to be taken in the context of the
limitations of shift-share analysis, as discussed above, and interpreted
with care. As growth in the older Asian tigers slows to its medium-
term potential, their export performance is also likely to moderate
relative to other economies in the region. This is a natural transition
and is largely dictated by supply-side considerations. A negative export
differential within a broad manufacturing category need not, therefore,
signify a loss of competitiveness overall, but rather conceal a natural
process of changing comparative advantage or a process of catching-
up as rising real wages and productivity result in a restructuring away
from labour-intensive industries towards higher value-added activities
within a given manufacturing category. This is also the case if the
diversification takes the form of a movement out of manufacturing
and into services, or into markets which may not be included in the
analysis.
Neither is shift-share a mechanistic tool signaling an inevitable process
of success or failure to compete in international markets since any
adverse movements in export competitiveness relative to the group as
a whole can be changed by implementation of appropriate policies,
such as trade liberalisation, incentives for inward FDI, or export
promotion.
It is also important to bear in mind when assessing the ‘Chinese threat’
that trade is not a zero sum game akin to a competitive sport since
trade between a group of countries usually generates symbiotic benefitsw
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to all concerned depending on the direct and indirect stimuli through
mutual imports. Thus whilst the NIEs are export competitors of China,
China is simultaneously an important market both for their final goods
and for their intermediate exports which are ultimately destined for
other markets, as well as a source for tourists and China-registered
FDI. Indeed, many of the east Asian economies, such as Singapore and
Malaysia, have been major beneficiaries of ‘growing neighbours’ in
the region in the last two decades due to relatively high trade openness
and strong trade multiplier linkages with regional economies
(Abeysinghe & Wilson, 2002).
Moreover, the strong growth in these countries’ exports to China has
partly resulted from a strengthening in the production network within
the region as they have been increasingly exporting intermediate
components, such as semiconductors and disk drives, to other Asian
countries which then assemble them into end products such as PCs
and telecommunications equipment. MNCs typically decentralise their
electronics production within the region in order to capitalise on the
comparative advantage of each country. Higher-end intermediate
electronics components (typically semiconductors), are produced in
one country and are then shipped to the other Asian countries for
assembly into final products for export to the developed country
markets. Thus, whilst Singapore, for example, has seen a decline in
the growth of its overall exports in recent years, this has been offset to
some extent by a rise in the importance of intermediate exports of
electronics components or re-exports to countries in the east Asian
region, including China (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2002).
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END NOTES
1 The concept of competitiveness is an illusive one with its origins in
the business literature analysis of corporate strategy, where trade is
a ‘zero sum game’ in terms of the quest for increased market share.w
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Standard trade theory, on the other hand (for example, Krugman
1994) is adamant that in an equilibrium setting all countries gain
from trade. But if the equilibrium assumptions are relaxed then the
picture is more complex and competitive advantage can then be
created by national policies. For a discussion of these issues, see Lall
and Albaladejo (2004).
2 Of course the trade to GDP ratio is only a crude proxy for trade
openness as are export growth and increases in export market shares.
China’s export growth rate declined over the 1990s for manufactured
products (reflecting the slowdown in world trade) but its export
structure shifted significantly towards medium and high technology
products. This evolution of export structures which are increasingly
similar to its competitors might suggest that China is becoming more
of a threat. See Lall and Albaledejo (2004) and Lall and Weiss (2005).
3 This may significantly understate Taiwan’s performance compared
to the other NIEs insofar as it’s electronics industry began relocating
out significantly after 1985 and directly to China from 1991, helped
by the integrated operations of markets, government investment in
R&D and high-tech human capital and ‘trust’. This helped to
transform Taiwan’s information hardware industry into one of high
volume, low margin production and into a global service provider.
See Rasiah and Yeo (2005).
4 Even within the 3-digit classification one cannot distinguish between
firms which are engaged in assembly-type activities based on simple
capacitors and resistors and the assembly of more sophisticated
microprocessors. We are grateful for an anonymous referee for
pointing this out.
5 Malaysia’s differentials after 1995 were overwhelmingly positive in
semiconductors but the averages were turned negative by a very
sizeable fall in 2000.
6 It is interesting that in Herschede’s (1991) earlier and broader shift-
share analysis of China, ASEAN and the NIEs, China’s less
impressive performance compared to the NIEs was also based on a
weaker industry mix effect.
7 Lall and Albaladejo (2004) found that China’s gains in export market
share in the 1990s compared to her neighbours in east Asia were
mainly in low technology products and differed by country. The
mature tigers, such as Singapore, Korea and Taiwan, suffered most,
particularly in low technology goods, but were already losingw
w
w
.ij
m
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y
92     IJMS 14 (1), 67-97 (2007)
competitiveness in these goods and they benefited significantly from
China’s role as an engine of growth and from complementarities.
These are not guaranteed in the future unless they can keep their
technological edge over China. The main threat is to the less
technologically advanced new tigers, such as Thailand and Malaysia,
that have much higher wages than China but lack the domestic
capabilities to keep ahead of it.
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APPENDIX 1: THE SHIFT SHARE FORMULA
The particular version of shift-share analysis used here is based on
Wilson (2000) and utilises the national growth rate methodology of
Richardson (1978) and Esteban-Marquillas (1972) but combines it with
the dynamic version of shift-share of Barff and Knight (1988).
Let e=exports, i=export category, j=a competing country, then the
change in exports of category i of competing economy j to a specific
destination deij is given by the share effect sij, the industry mix effect mij,
the competitive effect  cij and the interactive effect aij:
deij  =  sij + mij +  cij +  aij
In other words, each sector of each country has a standard growth
component given by sij to which must be added the positive and
negative contribution due to factors associated specifically with each
country (mij +  cij +  aij)
sij represents the change in exports which would have occurred if the
structure of exports in the competing economy had followed the
reference group (homothetic exports  e’ij) and its export category had
grown (rij ) at the corresponding group rate  ri0:
sij =  e’ij ri0          where e’ij  =  ei0  .  e0j / e00
ei0  =  exports of i from the reference group 0
e0j  =  total exports from the competing economy
e00  = total exports from the reference group
If eij - e’ij is positive the individual country is specialised relative to the
group and vice versa if it is negative. Hence any difference between
the actual changes in exports in sector i of country j and the share effect
sij represents the net shift or shift effect or export differential edij ascribed
to the specific characteristics of the individual economy and is
measured in absolute US dollar values.
edij  =  deij -  sij =  deij  -  e’ij ri0  =  eij rij -  e’ij ri0
A positive value for the export differential implies an improvement in
competitiveness relative to the reference group and a negative value
constitutes a deterioration in competitiveness. The export differential
is in turn accounted for by the three additive components mij, cij, and aij.w
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The industry mix effect mij shows how much of the export differential
is due to a divergence between the competing economy’s economic
structure compared to the reference group. It will be positive if a
country’s share of exports in fast growing industries is larger than the
reference group or its share in slow growing industries is smaller. On
the other hand, the mix effect will be unfavourable if the economy is
dominated by relatively slow growing industries or it has a dearth of
fast growing ones.
mij =  ri0 (eij - e’ij)
The competitive effect cij shows how much of the export differential is
due to a difference between the export growth rate of the competing
economy and the group, or in other words, the contribution due to the
special dynamism of that sector in the individual country compared
with the growth of that sector at the reference group level. If a country’s
growth exceeds the rate for the group the effect is positive and it has a
competitive advantage in that product category.
cij = e’ij (rij - ri0)
Finally, the interactive effect aij shows how much of the export
differential is attributable to a combination of the industry mix effect
and the competitive effect or economic structure and competitiveness.
It indicates whether the country is specialised in those sectors in which
it also enjoys a competitive advantage and will take on a positive value
if either the competing economy specialised on exports in which it has
a competitive advantage or produces little of the exports in which it
has no such advantage:
aij =  (eij - e’ij) (rij - ri0).
APPENDIX 2: CHINA’S AVERAGE EXPORT DIFFERENTIAL
DECOMPOSED 1988-2000
 
China 1988-1995 
Industry 
mix 
effect 
Competitive 
effect 
Interactive 
effect 
Differential 
  Disk drives, Printers, PCs 
       USA 
        Japan 
        EU 
        Total 
 
-166.75 
-155.5 
-154.13 
-512.63 
 
 
151.78 
3412.25 
2652.5 
5171 
 
 
-1453.63 
-3489.25 
-2601.25 
-5030.25 
 
 
-102.63 
-142.63 
-102.88 
-370.88 w
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   Printed circuit boards 
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-114 
-47.5 
-85 
-278.13 
 
 
136.38 
108.75 
1386.38 
498.88 
 
 
-123.13 
-101.13 
1370.25 
-459.88 
 
 
-100.75 
-40 
-69 
-239.13 
 
   Consumer electronics 
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-16 
-40.25 
-17.25 
-58.5 
 
 
445.13 
131.5 
524.75 
1147.75 
 
 
-319.13 
-109 
-418.5 
-885.88 
 
 
109.88 
-17.75 
88.88 
203 
 
   Telecoms equip 
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-11.48 
-20.63 
-55 
-72.25 
 
 
433.75 
203.13 
603 
1090.13 
 
 
-350 
-149.13 
-573.5 
-912.38 
 
 
72.25 
33.38 
-25.75 
105.25 
_ 
   Semiconductors 
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-263.89 
-202.5 
-171.25 
-631.19 
 
 
462 
463.38 
386.13 
1059 
 
 
-453.75 
-455.25 
-383.13 
-1036.75 
 
 
-255.75 
-169 
-168.25 
-609.63 
_ 
Electronics      
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-511.75 
-432.75 
-446.75 
1438.25 
 
 
2182.12 
763.75 
2093.75 
5706.63 
 
 
-1947 
-692.88 
-1923.75 
-5179.75 
 
 
-276.88 
-361.5 
-276.75 
-911.75 
 
 
China 1996-2000 
Industry 
mix 
effect 
Competitive 
effect 
Interactive 
effect 
Differential 
  Disk drives, Printers, PCs 
       USA 
        Japan 
        EU 
        Total 
 
-277.4 
-222.6 
-244.6 
-758.6 
 
 
1732 
187 
114.22 
3227.6 
 
 
-1215.2 
-160.2 
-752.4 
-2315.5 
 
 
239.8 
-195.8 
144.8 
152.8 
 
   Printed circuit boards 
     USA 
     Japan 
     EU 
     Total 
 
-245.4 
-239.4 
-228.8 
-740.8 
 
 
215.2 
-119 
67.2 
221.2 
 
 
-187 
64 
-55.6 
-187.2 
 
 
 
-217.6 
-294.2 
-217.2 
-706.8 
 
  Consumer electronics 
    USA 
    Japan 
    EU 
    Total 
 
38.3 
-7.2 
46.8 
51.2 
 
 
137.2 
23.4 
753.4 
1001.4 
 
 
17.8 
-14.14 
68.8 
-7.00 
 
 
 
193.4 
2.00 
869.2 
1045.4 
 
  Telecoms equip 
    USA 
    Japan 
    EU 
    Total 
 
-85.4 
18.6 
-45.6 
-103 
 
 
15.6 
42.25 
361.4 
329.2 
 
 
-3.6 
1.98 
-113.2 
-57 
 
 
-73.6 
88.2 
202.6 
169.2 
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  Semiconductors 
    USA 
    Japan 
    EU 
    Total 
 
-159.8 
-267.6 
-200.8 
-605.8 
 
 
1500.06 
731.2 
954.6 
3163.6 
 
 
-1432.2 
-652.4 
-895.4 
-2944.2 
 
 
-93.4 
-188.8 
-141.6 
-386.6 
 
Electronics      
    USA 
    Japan 
    EU 
    Total 
 
-822.2 
-653.8 
-878.8 
-2458.2 
 
 
2588 
282.2 
4143.2 
7628.6 
 
 
-1717.2 
-217 
-2406.4 
-4896 
 
 
48.4 
-588.8 
857.8 
274.2 
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